The Ecology of Organizational Demography: Managerial Tenure Distributions and Organizational Competition
Sociologists and organizational theorists have long been interested in understanding how the behavior and beliefs of individuals affect organizational outcomes. Yet the shift in organizational theory toward macro-level, open systems theories (Hannan and Freeman 1977; Meyer and Rowan 1977) and their emphasis on the organization's external environment has led to a decline in theorizing about how individuals influence organizational outcomes. As an exception to this trend, theories of organizational demography have emerged as a powerful means of linking easily observable demographic characteristics of management teams to organizational outcomes (Pfeffer 1983; Hambrick and Mason 1984) . Theorists in this tradition argue that the diversity of ideas and perspectives in a decision-making group reflects the degree of demographic heterogeneity of group members. This heterogeneity in outlooks is in turn thought to affect decision-making and organizational behavior.
Drawing on cohort arguments (Ryder 1965; Pfeffer 1983 ) organizational demographers have primarily studied the effects that managerial tenure distributions have on organizational behavior. Some studies suggest that increased demographic diversity is beneficial to organizations because it exposes the firm to a variety of influences and makes it more responsive to environmental changes. Along these lines, both Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven (1990) and Hambrick, Cho, and Chen (1996) have shown that heterogeneity in the tenure distribution of top management teams is associated with higher growth rates. Others argue that the diversity of perspectives that accompany demographic heterogeneity in fact impedes effective decision making
The Ecology of Organizational Demography 2 and reduces group integration. For example, Ancona and Caldwell (1992) found that heterogeneity in firm tenure was negatively associated with adaptive change among electronics firms.
A core assumption in this research tradition is that the values, beliefs and capabilities of individuals are shaped by their past experiences and therefore by the cohort to which they belong (Hambrick and Mason 1984; Finkelstein and Hambrick 1996; cf. Ryder 1965) . This implies, as a corollary, that an organization's capabilities are a function of the tenure distribution within the firm. The organizational demography argument thus consists of two interrelated claims: 1) the tenure distribution (or other demographic characteristics of the group) affects the distribution of managerial capabilities; and 2) the distribution of managerial capabilities influence organizational performance.
A common feature of organizational demography research is the adoption of a focal organization perspective. In other words, demographic effects are seen as internal to the firm; in particular, organizational demographers attribute no causal or mediating force to the demographic characteristics of other organizations. In this respect, such studies run counter to the prevailing open-systems emphasis on mutual organizational interdependence. More importantly, this atomistic approach seems internally inconsistent, given the central theoretical emphasis on the role of managerial experiences in shaping organizational capabilities. Organizations facing a common environment will be exposed to a common pattern of environmental change. People working with these organizations will therefore also have overlapping experiences. Unless one assumes that all relevant managerial experiences are firm-specific, this implies that organizations whose managers have similar tenures (in a common competitive setting) will have similar capabilities.
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The full competitive implications of an organization's tenure distribution therefore only can be understood in an ecological framework that incorporates the tenure distribution of its competitors. From an ecological perspective, firms should benefit, on average, to the extent that they possess unique capabilities; in other words, to the extent that their managerial tenure distributions are distinctive. Conversely, the greater the extent to which firms are led by managers with similar capabilities, the more intensely they will compete for resources (Hannan and Freeman 1989) . This paper explores two primary implications of an ecological approach to organizational demography processes. First, I focus on the effects of overlap in the tenure distribution among competitors. I argue that the greater the extent to which a firm's tenure distribution matches those of its competitors, the greater the competitive pressure the firm will experience, which in turn leads to lower growth rates. Second, I explore the consequences of increases in an organization's mean tenure relative to the mean tenure level of its competitors. Arguments in both the organizational demography (Katz 1982) and organizational ecology (Baron, West and Hannan 1994) literatures suggest that increases in the mean tenure of management teams leads to declines in organization-environment fit over time. In this case, an ecological perspective suggests that such a decline in fit will be particularly detrimental to performance if other firms are better aligned with environmental demands. McPherson's in several key respects, however. First, in applying these ideas to a population of for-profit, employing organizations, my interest is not in how the social similarity of members affects competition for members, but rather in how it affects competition for other resources, in this case television viewers.
2 I thereby link two dimensions of the resource space by showing how a firm's performance in its product market depends on its position in the social space defined by its member's attributes. Furthermore, I capture similarity between managers not in terms of socio-demographic characteristics such as age or education, but rather in terms of the timing of entry into top management teams. The central idea is that managerial capabilities are shaped by experiences in a given competitive context; in other words, managerial decision making and cognitive frameworks depend on past experiences (Daft and Weick 1984; Porac and Thomas 1990 ).
This paper more generally makes contributions to the organizational ecology literature, in particular the growing bodies of work on niche crowding or overlap (Podolny, Stuart and Hannan 1996) and localized competition (Hannan, Ranger-Moore, and Banaszak-Holl 1990; Baum and Mezias 1992) . Elaborating on density dependence theory (Hannan and Carroll 1992) and network theories of competition (Burt 1992) , researchers have developed increasingly sophisticated measures of the proximity of organizations in resource space. In line with this tradition, I argue that overlap among firms along the tenure distribution implies overlap in managerial capabilities; this overlap in capabilities in turn increases interorganizational competition. The focus on overlap in managerial capabilities is unique and important, since Hambrick 1997) , then the relative locations of firms in this experience distribution can have a fundamental influence on the structure and dynamics of organizational competition.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, I lay out in more detail the implications of an ecological approach to the effects of organizational demography on firm performance. From this argument, I derive a series of testable hypotheses concerning the effects of overlap in tenure distributions and mean tenure levels on firm growth rates. I then test these hypotheses on a longitudinal sample of commercial television stations in the United States.
Managerial Tenure Distributions and the Ecology of Competition
In past studies of organizational demography, the tenure distribution has received the lion's share of attention. Much of this research has focused on the demographic characteristics of top management teams, under the assumption that organizational behavior reflects "the values and cognitive bases of powerful actors in the organization" (Hambrick and Mason 1984: 193) . This perspective assumes that the presence of bounded rationality and multiple, conflicting goals means that organizational decisions come to reflect the "givens" that each decision maker brings to the situation (March and Simon 1958; Cyert and March 1963) . Hambrick (1994) argues that top management team characteristics are consistently better predictors of organizational outcomes than CEO characteristics. For these reasons, I follow previous research and focus on the demography of the top management team, as opposed to the demographic characteristics of any one individual or of the entire organization.
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Most research in organizational demography has focused on the consequences of tenure for group processes within organizations. With respect to tenure, two distributional characteristics have garnered attention: the mean level of tenure in a group, and the degree of tenure heterogeneity.
Several researchers have emphasized the consequences of mean tenure levels for organizational outcomes. Pfeffer (1983) argued that increased tenure improves employee performance as understandings of organizational routines improve and the employee adjusts to the new organization (cf. McNeil and Thompson 1971) . Katz (1982) argued that increased group tenure reduces goal conflict and improves social integration; this is in part due to the fact that increases in group tenure also lead to restricted information processing. Finkelstein and Hambrick (1990) argue that tenure increases top managers' commitment to the organizational status quo, makes individuals more risk averse and less open to new information, and increases the likelihood that they will emulate the behavior of other organizations in their industry. Lant and Mezias (1992) argue that higher levels of tenure improve first order learning (e.g., the mastery of established routines) but hinder second-order learning (e.g., learning from sudden environmental changes).
Others have emphasized tenure heterogeneity as a driver of organizational outcomes. The consequences of tenure heterogeneity for organizational outcomes are also mixed, however (Carroll and Harrison 1998; Pfeffer 1997) . On the one hand, heterogeneity may be beneficial to organizations, as it implies a greater diversity of perspectives and exposure to more sources of information. Heterogeneity may therefore be particularly beneficial in situations where creativity and innovation are required (Hambrick, Cho and Chen 1996) .
Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven
The Ecology of Organizational Demography 7 (1990), for example, show that growth among semiconductor firms is positively related to heterogeneity in top team tenure. Hambrick, Cho and Chen (1996) also find a positive effect of tenure heterogeneity on growth among airlines; moreover, they find that heterogeneous teams are more likely to initiate new strategic moves. On the other hand, tenure heterogeneity has also been found to have negative effects. In particular, a diversity of perspectives may make communication and social integration more difficult (Ancona and Caldwell 1992) . O'Reilly, Snyder and Boothe (1993) found that heterogeneity in firm tenure was negatively associated with adaptive change among electronics firms. Smith et al. (1994) found a negative effect of tenure heterogeneity on informal communication among team members. Hambrick, Cho and Chen (1996) found that tenure heterogeneity had a negative effect on an airline's propensity to respond to the competitive moves of other airlines.
As this review indicates, the focus of research in organizational demography has been on the consequences of the tenure distribution for group processes in the top management team.
While these group processes are rarely studied directly (for exceptions, see O'Reilly, Caldwell and Barnett 1989; Glick, Miller and Huber 1993; Smith et al., 1994) , most arguments rely on them in order to link demographic characteristics to firm outcomes. However, the tenure distribution of a top management team has implications for firm performance beyond its consequences for internal group processes. In particular, it affects how the firm interprets its environment and competitive situation, and therefore shapes resource allocation decisions.
A long tradition in organizational research suggests that the perceptions and interpretations a manager brings to decision-making situations will reflect his or her "cognitive base" (March and Simon 1958; Hambrick and Mason 1984) . These cognitive frameworks restrict including education, training, and on-the-job experiences. Thus cognitive perspectives on managerial decision making suggest that the ways in which managers interpret and react to competitive situations will depend on their past experiences (March and Simon 1958; Hambrick and Mason 1984; Daft and Weick 1984; Porac and Thomas 1990) . A manager's on-the-job experiences are a form of on-the-job training which shapes the nature of the manager's human capital.
By extension, qualitative differences in managerial capabilities derive in part from differences in experiences, which are captured in the relative tenures of managers: the degree to which two individuals will have similar experiences in a role (in this case, top manager in a particular market) depends on their relative times of entry into the role. If managers draw lessons from past experiences, then the more similar those experiences are, the more likely it is that two managers will draw similar conclusions and have similar managerial capabilities. This suggests that a firm's behavior depends on the pool of events and experiences its managers have to draw upon in assessing new situations.
When we turn to compare tenure distributions among firms in a market, it becomes apparent that organizations (in the same competitive context) with similar tenure distributions will have management teams with similar experience profiles; this isomorphism in managerial experiences implies that the firms draw on similar managerial capabilities. Note that I am not claiming that managers with similar tenures will have identical experiences. For example, differences between organizations (in culture, competitive position, etc.) may lead managers in
The Ecology of Organizational Demography 9 different firms to interpret the same events differently. However, managers with exposure to a common set of events are more likely to have similar perspectives than managers with wholly different experiences.
In ecological terms, the tenure distribution of the top management team defines the firm's niche in the managerial labor market. A firm's tenure distribution is therefore not only an organizational attribute, but also a relational attribute: it defines an organization's position with respect to other organizations in its environment. Furthermore, since managers decide which resources to employ (and how they should be employed) based on their interpretations of the environment, the organization's position in the market for managerial talent affects its overall competitive position.
In this respect, tenure as an organizational attribute is similar to organizational size.
Organizational size not only has implications for organizational structure (Blau and Schoenherr 1971) , but also for a firm's relation to its environment. Hannan and Freeman (1977: 945) suggested that large organizations, in part due to the changes in structure caused by growth, depend on a different mix of resources than small firms. Basic ecological assumptions imply that the more similar the resource requirements of organizations, the greater the level of (perhaps latent) competition between them Freeman 1977, 1989) . This reasoning suggests that competition will be localized along the size distribution in a population; organizations will compete most intensely with other organizations of similar size. Previous research has indeed uncovered evidence of such size-localized competitive processes. Baum and Mezias (1992) , for example, find evidence of size-localized competition in the Manhattan hotel industry; Baum and Mezias (1993) found similar effects in a population of day care centers.
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3 Like the size-localized competition argument, my argument depends on the underlying assumption that there are heterogeneous resources that potentially support different competitive positions. Differentiation from competitors is only a viable strategy to the extent that the environment supports the new competitive position.
By a similar logic, I expect that firms with similar top management tenure distributions will compete more intensely, due to their overlap in managerial capabilities.
3 Overlap in managerial capabilities may increase competitive pressures in two ways. First, firms that depend on similar managerial capabilities may pursue similar strategies. Geletkanycz and Hambrick (1997) show that the diversity of experiences in a top management team is an important determinant of strategic conformity in an industry: firms that draw heavily on intraindustry experiences are more likely to conform to prevailing strategic practices in the industry. In particular, their research shows that ties to people outside the firm's competitive context increases exposure to new ideas and practices and lowers strategic conformity; ties to people within the same competitive context encourages the development of common understandings of the competitive environment and hence increases strategic conformity. By a similar argument, when comparing top management teams across firms, we can expect that firms with similar tenure distributions will be more likely to operate from a common understanding of the competitive situation and hence more likely to adopt similar strategies. By contrast, firms with dissimilar tenure distributions should be more likely to pursue dissimilar strategies and thus compete less intensely with each other.
Even among firms pursuing similar strategies, however, there may be competitive advantages to relying on different managerial capabilities. The experiences of managers may also affect the ways in which strategies are executed (Gunz and Jalland 1996) . If firms relying on similar managerial capabilities are more likely to implement their strategies in a similar fashion, they will compete more intensely for resources. For example, two television stations may both pursue the same strategy of showing local news at 11, but they may execute these strategies quite differently depending on the experiences and capabilities of their management team. To the extent that the two stations adopt approaches to news broadcasts that draw on the same environmental resources, they will compete more intensely. Thus both stations may decide to place a heavy emphasis on coverage of local crime. 4 If so, they will compete for access to at least two types of resources -criminal events and viewers who prefer this type of news. A station emphasizing local politics and education would by contrast experience relatively less competition for resources.
5
Thus overlap in managerial capabilities may increase competitive pressures even in settings where strategic positions are highly institutionalized. Both arguments suggest that the level of competition between organizations should be a function of the degree to which their managerial tenure distributions overlap; the total competitive pressure experienced by the firm will consequently be a direct function of the crowding around its position in the tenure distribution. Firms in more crowded regions of the distribution will experience greater competitive pressure than firms in sparsely populated regions.
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The level of competition between organizations is difficult to measure directly; however, it can be observed indirectly by considering its implications for different organizational outcomes.
Ecological studies have demonstrated that organizational growth rates vary inversely with the degree of competition for resources (Barron, West and Hannan 1994; Podolny, Stuart and Hannan 1996; Barnett 1994) . As the number of competitors for a fixed set of resources increases, growth becomes more difficult. I therefore expect that crowding around a firm's position in the tenure distribution will have a negative effect on growth rates. This crowding can be measured in two ways, depending on how one chooses to capture a firm's location in the tenure distribution.
The first alternative is to use a measure of central tendency, such as the mean, to represent the firm's position. In this case, crowding around the firm's position can be measured (inversely) by the average Euclidean distance between the focal firm's mean tenure and that of its competitors.
This leads to the following hypothesis concerning the effects of a firm's location in the tenure distribution across firms:
Hypothesis 1a: Growth rates will increase with a firm's distance from its competitors along the tenure distribution. Hypothesis 1b: Growth rates will be a negative function of a firm's overlap with its competitors along the tenure distribution.
Organizational demography research suggests that as mean tenure levels increase, the likelihood that a firm's managerial capabilities will be misaligned with its environment increases.
For example, organizational demographers argue that increases in mean tenure are accompanied by increasingly restricted information processing and an unwillingness to take risks (Katz 1982) . Lant and Mezias (1992) argue that as average tenure increases, the management team becomes increasingly adept at carrying out established routines (first-order learning) but decreasingly able to learn from new, unfamiliar environmental conditions (second-order learning). Consistent with this, Finkelstein and Hambrick (1990) find a strong positive relationship between mean tenure and strategic persistence or a firm's resistance to engage in strategic change. In the face of environmental change, such strategic persistence can cause a decline in fit between managerial capabilities and environmental demands. This inertia can be a particular liability if a firm's competitors experience greater levels of turnover and thereby remain in better alignment with the environment; thus long-tenured management teams should be at a particular disadvantage when crowding in the market occurs around low levels of tenure. Conversely, any liability due to misalignment with the environment is mitigated to the extent that other management teams suffer from the same degree of misalignment. Thus for long tenured management teams, crowding may
The Ecology of Organizational Demography 14 6 Long-tenured management teams may -regardless of the level of crowding -still exploit environmental opportunities less efficiently than short-tenured teams. If such resources are sufficiently attractive, other firms will generally enter (Porter 1980) . It is important in this respect that television stations are to a large extent sheltered (by FCC regulation of broadcast licenses) from threats of entry by new competitors. be preferable to its absence. 6 By the same logic, a short-tenured management team should find advantages in a setting where its competitors primarily have long-tenured management teams.
Crowding around high levels of tenure implies that most firms are pursuing relatively inappropriate strategies and hence leaving resources unexploited. If short-tenured management
teams are more open to new ideas (Finkelstein and Hambrick 1990 ) and more willing to take risks (Katz 1982) , then they should be better able to exploit such new niches. This suggests the following related hypotheses:
Hypothesis 2a: Distance from competitors will be relatively advantageous for management teams with low average tenure and disadvantageous for management teams with high average tenure.
Hypothesis 2b: Overlap will be relatively advantageous for management teams with high average tenure and disadvantageous for management teams with low average tenure.
These hypotheses can be tested using an interaction effect between mean tenure and the respective crowding measures.
Data and Methods
The data for most research in organizational demography have come from random samples of organizations selected according to different criteria. For example Smith et al. (1994) selected a sample of technology intensive firms. Finkelstein and Hambrick (1990) chose a sample of firms in the computer, chemical, and natural-gas distribution industries. A sampling approach
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7 The rapid spread of cable television, and the attendant emergence of "super-stations", has weakened the boundaries between markets somewhat. Cable television grew rapidly in the 1980s, so this weakening occurred at the tail end of the sample analyzed in this paper.
does not allow for a consideration of the ecological consequences of management team demography; the data requirements for this paper are therefore correspondingly higher. In order to test the ideas behind Hypotheses 1 and 2, a longitudinal record of a complete population of competing firms is required, including data on the executive personnel employed by each firm.
I have collected this type of data for the commercial television broadcasting industry.
Archival sources contain rich information on organizational characteristics, personnel and performance of local television stations, in addition to data on environmental conditions. By tracking the personnel lists over time, I am able to compute the mean tenure for management teams at each station in a market, every year. By collecting information on all competitors, I am able to construct the tenure distribution across competing firms for each year of data. This is task is simplified by another aspect of local television broadcasting: the regulation of competition by the Federal Communications Commission. Because the FCC defines local broadcast markets and assigns broadcast licenses by market, the geographical dispersion of television stations is a fundamental structural feature of the industry. These broadcast markets segregate competition for viewers; a station in New York does not compete for viewers with a station in Chicago.
Therefore, a station's direct competitors can readily be identified as the other stations in the focal station's market. 7 The Ecology of Organizational Demography 16 8 The Factbook was not published in 1962, 1975 and 1983. 9 The choice of 1988 as a cutoff was dictated largely by the availability of resources and is therefore arbitrary. Only data on local, commercial broadcast stations were collected; public and educational television stations were excluded since the Factbook does not include information on the station personnel or on the circulation levels of public television stations. In addition to other broadcast television stations, a station also competes with cable franchises and (to a lesser extent) radio stations. Data on cable operators and radio stations were not collected. The models presented here therefore do no account for the full range of competitive influences that television stations are subject to. Nonetheless, the main competitors faced by an individual station are the other stations in its market (Eastman, Head and Klein 1989) ; the number of other commercial television stations is a conservative measure of the competitive pressure faced by a station.
The hypothesized effects of overlap in the tenure distributions of television station management teams will only be found if the behavior of television station managers can be expected to affect firm performance. With respect to the outcome studied here -viewershipmanagerial choices concerning programming and promotion are important determinants of success. Since independent stations (i.e., those not affiliated with a major broadcast network) are responsible for all of their own programming and promotion, it is clear that the management team has an impact on station performance. However, the majority of stations are affiliates of the major broadcast networks; affiliates receive over half of their programming from the networks.
Given this, what do (affiliate) station managers do? While the managers of network affiliates in particular might seem to be little more than order-takers, they in fact play an important role in responding to local competitive conditions (Eastman, Head and Klein 1989) . Affiliate managers remain responsible for local promotion, including community relations and tie-ins with local events. Affiliate managers also choose programming for the parts of the schedule that are not broadcast is an important source of viewer loyalty and brand identity in the local market. Affiliate managers must also be effective in choosing programming that leads in and out of network feeds, such that the local station is able to retain the audience generated by network programming. Thus while the audience size of a network affiliate is in part determined by the network's programming, the decisions of local station managers are also important in drawing and retaining viewers (Eastman, Head and Klein 1989) .
Models of Organizational Growth
In order to test the hypotheses regarding the effects of mean team tenure and a organization's location in the tenure distribution, I estimate models of organizational growth. As noted earlier, organizations that experience greater competition for resources will have lower growth rates on average. I estimate models of growth in a station's net weekly circulation, defined as the total number of homes that tuned in to a station at least once during a given week.
Measures of organizational size should measure both the success of an organization in utilizing environmental resources and the burden an organization places on the environmental carrying capacity. The circulation data are measures of both an organization's success in exploiting resource opportunities and an organization's impact on its environment. Station viewership is of intense interest to advertisers (as well as the stations themselves), inducing firms to provide widely accessible data on viewership. 
(1)
We can express the growth of organizations as a function of an organization's size and a number of covariates characterizing organizational and environmental characteristics:
where S is a time-varying measure of organizational size, " is an adjustment parameter that indicates how growth rates depend on organizational size, and $ is a vector of parameters characterizing the effects of organizational and environmental covariates.
If we take the log of Equation 1 and rearrange terms, we have the following log-linear model suitable for estimation with linear methods:
The data is arranged in the form of a pooled cross-section/time series data set, with each television station contributing a time series of observations. The length of each station's time series may differ because of missing data, or because a station is founded or fails during the observation period. To correct for autocorrelation, I use a fixed effects or least squares with constants estimator (Balestra and Nerlove 1966; Tuma and Hannan 1984) , which includes a dummy variable for each station in the sample.
Measures
The tenure distribution of the top managers with each firm is the measure of central interest here. At least three types of tenure might be used: time with the top management team Inspection of the job titles suggests that they are quite standardized across organizations. A total of 6,321 unique names were collected in the fifteen markets studied. The mean number of employees declined steadily over time. In 1961, the mean number of team members listed was 9.2. The average team size declined gradually, eventually reaching a mean of 7.4 in 1987. The decline in team sizes is largely attributable to the growth of independent stations, which have 10 This measure is potentially sensitive to outliers. In particular, the presence of competitors far from the focal firm's tenure will inflate the measure, independently of the distribution of firms in the focal firm's tenure neighborhood. However, this problem is mitigated here by using the log of mean tenure in Eq. 3; the range of log mean tenure is 3.5 years. Experimentation with alternative constructions of the distance measure (including the use of the
smaller staffs on average for a variety of reasons. For example, independent stations often do not have news departments.
For each station, the tenure values are averaged across all of the team members in a given year. It seems plausible that an additional year of average experience should have a greater impact on performance for young teams than for older teams. Therefore, I use the natural logarithm of mean team tenure in the models presented below; however, models using the untransformed mean tenure resulted is substantively similar findings
The first measure of crowding is the average Euclidean distance between the focal firm's mean tenure and the mean tenure of each of its competitors. Euclidean distance is a commonly used measure in studies of localized competition (Hannan, Ranger-Moore and Banaszak-Holl 1990; Baum and Mezias 1992, 1993) . This measure captures the extent to which the focal station's mean tenure differs from that of its competitors; firms in more crowded regions of the tenure distribution will have low values of this measure while isolated firms will have high distance scores. The average distance score for firm i in year t is defined as where x it is the (logged) measure of mean team tenure and N is the number of stations in the focal firm's market. 10 Since competition in the television broadcasting industry is highly segmented by
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inverse of mean tenure in Eq. 3) yielded substantively similar results.
broadcast market, I only compare the mean tenure of a station to that of its direct competitors for viewers. As a consequence, the distance measure in Equation 3 is computed by comparing a station's mean tenure to the mean tenure of other stations in the same market only.
I define each station's tenure niche as a two standard deviation window centered on the mean level of team tenure. Following McPherson (1983) , I compare the tenure niches for each pair of stations in a market to compute pairwise overlap scores. If we define a i as the lower boundary of the niche (i.e., the mean tenure minus one standard deviation), and b i as the upper boundary (i.e., the mean tenure plus one standard deviation), then the extent to which firm j overlaps on the niche of firm i is given by:
If the numerator in this equation is less than zero, " ijt is set to zero. A crowding measure can then be constructed by computing the average overlap across all other competitors in the focal firm's market:
Note that while the Euclidean distance measure defined in Equation 3 is symmetric (i.e., the distance from firm i to j is the same as from j to i), the niche overlap measure in Equation 4 relaxes this assumption. The crowding experienced by a focal firm due to a given amount of
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overlap will depend on the width of the firm's niche -i.e., the heterogeneity of its tenure distribution.
One feature of the crowding measures used here is that overlap between two firms is an indication that they have tended to recruit at the same times. A firm that experiences a high degree of crowding, in other words, has been unfortunate enough to recruit at the same times as its competitors. If labor markets are very tight, such a firm may be forced to settle for managers of lower quality; this would lead the average quality of recruits to be lower for firms in crowded conditions. A negative relationship between crowding along the tenure distribution and growth may therefore be due to inferior management skills, and not overlap in managerial capabilities.
However, it does not seem likely that this will occur, for a number of reasons. First, this scenario depends heavily on the assumption that the supply of qualified managers is tight and unresponsive to demand. Given that these stations are members of the highest status broadcast markets, it seems reasonable to assume that they would be able to find qualified talent. Furthermore, the construction of the crowding measures allows firms to overlap even if they did not recruit in the exact same year. Finally, separate analyses (not shown here) suggest that the results presented below are not spurious. For example, the number of managers hired by the other stations in a market does not significantly affect individual-level turnover rates, a crude measure of the fit between employer and employee. Also, inclusion of the same measure (aggregated to the team level) in the growth models below does not affect the conclusions drawn with respect to the effects of crowding.
Finally, there is some endogeneity in the relationship between tenure distributions and population-level competitive processes (Haveman 1995 accompanied by the wholesale creation and destruction of jobs. By influencing the supply and demand for labor, these processes affect mean tenure levels and tenure heterogeneity in existing organizations. In a study of California thrifts, Haveman (1995) finds that population dynamics indeed have complex effects on demographic characteristics; in particular, the impact of births and deaths on a firm's tenure distribution appears to depend on the size of the firm. However, the impact of any such endogeneity would appear to be minimal in this study. First, the television broadcasting industry experiences relatively little population turnover, as entry is regulated by the FCC and firms rarely fail. Moreover, the number of employees varies little across firms. Finally, it should be kept in mind that tenure distributions are also importantly shaped by the employment and career decisions of employers and employees.
Control Variables
I control for a number of organizational and environmental characteristics in the growth models. At the organizational level, I control for station age and the dispersion (standard deviation) in team tenure. Most ecological studies of growth have found negative age dependence in growth rates when controlling for size (e.g., Barnett 1994; Barron, West and Hannan 1994) , reflecting either the increasing obsolescence of an organization's capabilities or an increasing inability to respond rapidly to environmental changes. More importantly, station age and team tenure are strongly correlated when stations are young, since the age of the station sets an upper bound on the mean tenure measure.
The standard deviation in team tenure is included as a measure of the heterogeneity of the top management team. Social integration arguments would suggest that growth will decline with
The Ecology of Organizational Demography 25 increases in heterogeneity as group cohesiveness suffers. On the other hand, the diversity of perspectives in more heterogeneous teams may benefit the firm, particularly in rapidly changing environments such as broadcast television.
Two measures of environmental conditions are included in the models. Given the local nature of competition among television stations for viewers, it is best to specify these factors at the level of broadcast markets. A natural measure of the carrying capacity in television broadcast markets is the number of households with a television. Yearly estimates of the number of television households are taken from the "spot television market" volumes of the Standard Rate and Data Service. Finally, the models include a measure of market density, the number of commercial television stations in a focal firm's market.
I also include a number of control variables specific to the television industry. I control for each station's visual broadcast power. The increased resources that derive from membership in ownership groups may also promote circulation growth. Finally, the performance of network affiliates can in part be attributed to the performance of the network they are affiliated with;
affiliates suffer if a network's prime time schedule is unpopular, and reap the benefits of successful network programming strategies. To control for network affiliation, I include a separate dummy variable for each of the major networks (ABC, CBS, and NBC) for each year a station is affiliated with a given network. Finally, the models include two additional control variables. Data gap indexes years that follow a missing year of data due to the unavailability of the Factbook. The Same Network dummy is coded one in those rare instances where an affiliate is exposed to competition from another local station affiliated with the same network.
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Descriptive statistics for all variables are presented in Table 2 . Because the fixed effects estimator utilizes the within-station variance, 
Results
The first column of Table 3 presents estimates from a baseline model of organizational growth, including measures of organizational demography. As expected, the coefficient for lagged circulation is significantly less than unity, indicating the growth rates decline with size.
This finding is in line with previous (disconfirming) tests of Gibrat's law (Barron, West and Hannan 1994; Barnett 1994; Baum and Mezias 1993) . Growth rates also decline with organizational age, membership in ownership groups and network affiliation. A station's growth rate is higher when the size of its broadcast market exceeds the historical average for that station, but the number of stations in a market has no significant effect on growth rates.
The dispersion in team tenure does not have a significant effect on growth rates among television stations. However, mean tenure has a highly significant negative effect on growth rates.
Since the estimate is from a fixed effects model, it indicates that a station's growth rate is lower in those periods when its mean team tenure exceeds its historical average. As the team tenure increases, station performance suffers. This is consistent with the notion that increases in tenure lead to increased strategic persistence and -in the face of environmental change -misalignment with environmental demands (Finkelstein and Hambrick 1990) .
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The next model tests Hypothesis 1a by adding the Euclidean distance measure, which measures (the lack of) crowding around a station's location in the tenure distribution across firms.
As expected, this distance measure has a significant, positive effect on firm performance. In other words, firms that are further removed from their competitors in terms of their level of mean tenure have higher growth rates. Model 3 uses niche overlap as a measure of crowding and leads to the same conclusion: a station's average overlap with other stations along the tenure distribution has a significant, negative effect on growth rates. These findings support the claim that a firm's competitive position is affected by its location in the tenure distribution across firms; the greater the overlap in managerial experiences, the greater the competition between stations for resources and the lower the growth rates.
Model 4 includes the interaction effect between mean team tenure and the Euclidean distance measure. The coefficient estimate is significant and negative, supporting Hypothesis 2a.
In Model 5, Hypothesis 2b is also supported through a significant positive interaction effect between niche overlap and mean team tenure. In order to ease interpretation of these effects, Note that at high levels of mean tenure, overlap may be preferable to non-overlap: if you are going to rely on inappropriate managerial capabilities, better to have your competitors do so as well.
As an example of the liabilities associated with the combination of high tenure levels and distance from competitors along the tenure distribution, consider the case of WMUR, a station in the Boston broadcast market. This station experienced no turnover in its four-person top management team between 1964 and 1980, and recruited no new members until 1983. By the end of this period, the mean team tenure at WMUR was over 20 years; the average across other stations in the same market was never greater than four years. Thus the distance along the tenure distribution between WMUR and its competitors grew; its overlap with other stations was zero throughout the 1970s. The evidence suggests that WMUR pursued outmoded strategies during this period. As an example, WMUR was best known for "Uncle Gus" Bernier, who divided his time between hosting a children's show, doing the weather (dressed as a gas station attendant due to the program's sponsorship by an oil company) and occasionally reading the news. WMUR continued the "Uncle Gus Show" until 1981, long after other stations had abandoned similar programming and developed more professional newsrooms (Grove 1987) . Similarly, WMUR did not make the transition to color broadcasts until the mid-1970s. Not surprisingly, in the early 1980s, WMUR had the lowest ratings in its market (Grove 1987) .
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11 If firms assemble management teams after changing strategy, levels of mean tenure will reflect the recency of strategic change, and the effect of tenure on growth would be a spurious effect of strategy. However, this ignores the fact that most strategic changes are conceived of and implemented by the top management team itself, or with their consent; it is unlikely that most top management teams would go along with strategies that required their own dismissal. This is supported empirically by the fact that dramatic year-to-year changes in mean tenure are rare in this sample; in only 3% of station-year spells is the mean tenure less than half of the previous years tenure.
The interaction effects may also result from mutual adjustment and collusion processes between competitors. Consider the case of long-tenured firms with high levels of crowding. The managers of these firms have, essentially, been interacting with each other over an extended period of time. This history of interaction may facilitate tacit collusion as competitors become better able to predict how other firms will react to different situations. The longer the managers have been interacting -that is, the higher the tenure level -the easier such mutual adjustment becomes. Note however, that this arrangement will only work for mutual benefit as long as none of the parties experiences substantial turnover and crowding decreases. It is not possible to adjudicate between these alternative scenarios with this data; however, future research may be designed to address this question.
The interaction effects raise the possibility, however, that differences in tenure distributions reflect the strategic positions of firms, and not vice-versa.
11 For example, turnover dynamics may differ systematically according to a firm's competitive position as the relative power of employers and employees shifts (Phillips 1998; Phillips and Sørensen 1999) . In this case, levels of crowding along the tenure distribution would reflect the firm's competitive positioning and the results in Table 3 would be spurious. I approach this problem by using network affiliation status as a measure of the niche occupied by each station. The presence of the major broadcast networks (ABC, CBS, NBC) effectively creates two distinct strategic groups within most markets: network affiliates and independent stations. As a consequence of the network programming they carry, network affiliates pursue generalist strategies in trying to appeal to a broad spectrum of the television audience. Independent stations, by contrast, typically pursue specialist strategies by targeting their programming at particular audience segments, for example by broadcasting local sports teams. Network affiliates are more constrained in their programming choices, but their generalist strategies and the resources provided by the networks also provide them with more slack to cope with fluctuations in audience tastes (Hannan and Freeman 1989) .
Network affiliation status therefore defines two types of programming niches -network affiliate and independent station. I use this distinction to create two different niche overlap measures: overlap with stations of the same network affiliation status as the focal station ("own overlap"), and overlap with stations of a different network affiliation status as the focal station ("other overlap"). These variables measure crowding along the tenure distribution while controlling for each station's programming niche. The "own overlap" variable is therefore a measure of the extent to which stations occupying the same programming niche as the focal firm are crowded around its position in the tenure distribution. Conversely, the "other overlap" measure captures the extent to which stations of a different affiliation status are crowded around the focal firm's position in the tenure distribution.
The models in Table 4 examine the effects of these measures. In the first column of Table   4 , we see that "own overlap" has the same pattern of effects as the overall crowding measure.
Growth rates decline as firms of the same network affiliation status as the focal firm are crowded around its position along the tenure distribution. Furthermore, the interaction effect between
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12 A t-test of the difference in the mean circulation levels of network affiliates and independent stations confirms that network affiliates have higher circulation levels (t=12.96).
team tenure and "own overlap" is positive and statistically significant as before. The estimates in the second column of Table 4 show that crowding by stations of a different network affiliation status has no significant effect on the focal station's growth rate. The final model in Table 4 includes both measures; again, the effects of crowding by stations of the same type of the focal firm follow expectations, while the crowding by stations of a different type have no effect on performance.
Finally, the robustness of the overlap effects in Table 4 suggest that the overlap measure is not simply capturing size-localized competition effects (e.g., Hannan, Ranger-Moore and Banaszak-Holl 1990) . This is due to the fact that network affiliation status is an effective proxy for size differences among television stations: independent stations are typically smaller than network affiliates, in part because they have less original programming to offer viewers. 12 The results in Table 4 therefore suggest that even among firms that occupy similar positions in the size distribution, overlap in managerial tenure distributions increases competitive pressures.
Discussion
Since a firm's overall competitive positioning is to a large extent a reflection of the decisions made by top managers, its position in the market for managerial talent has wide-ranging consequences for its competitive position. The tenure distribution, I have argued, captures qualitative differences in managerial capabilities. The estimates in Tables 3 and 4 provide strong evidence to support the claim that competition increases with crowding along the tenure distribution of top management teams. Thus the timing of turnover, relative to competitors, shapes organizational outcomes.
These findings reinforce the central insights of organizational demography research, namely that managerial capabilities are shaped by past experiences (as captured by demographic characteristics), and that organizational behavior is affected by the distribution of these capabilities. The goal of this paper, however, has been to demonstrate the ecological implications of this insight. If it is true that managerial behavior is influenced by past experiences, then we should expect commonality in behavior across firms to the extent that managers in these firms have been exposed to similar environmental conditions. In this sense, an organization's demographic composition is a relational characteristic that defines its position with respect to other organizations. Moreover, the impact of demographic characteristics on firm performance appears to be mediated by a firm's location in the demographic distribution across firms. A full understanding of organizational demography effects requires an ecological perspective.
The findings in this paper also support and extend previous research on the effects of niche overlap or crowding on organizational outcomes (McPherson 1983; Podolny, Stuart and Hannan 1996) and studies of localized competition more generally (Hannan, Ranger- Second, greater attention should be paid to other sources of similarity and differences in managerial capabilities. As noted, this study is limited in that it only considers overlap in terms of a narrow range of managerial experiences and does not consider similarity in organizational or industry tenure. Other sources of isomorphism in managerial capabilities may not depend on common work experiences, suggesting that other demographic attributes (such as age, education, race, etc.) should be explored as well as sources of overlap among firms.
The interaction effects between mean tenure and the crowding measures raise a number of interesting issues as well. The results suggest that the detrimental effects of crowding around a firm's position in the tenure distribution decline as the mean tenure of the team increases. In line with these findings, I have argued that long-tenured management teams are particularly vulnerable when their competitors primarily have lower levels of tenure, because the short-tenured firms are able to exploit the lack of fit between the long-tenured teams capabilities and environmental demands. Thus the relationship between the quality of organization-environment fit and a firm's life chances depends on the relative fitness of other competitors. This suggests more generally that the impact of demographic characteristics on firm outcomes is mediated by the broader context, particularly the demographic attributes of other firms. The exploration of such mediating effects should be an important avenue for future research.
Conclusion
Human resources are unlike other firm resources in that they have volition. Ultimately, the tenure distributions of top management teams are driven by turnover processes, and hence are by incorporating managers into macro-level theories, yet these issues are present in other setting as well. From a research perspective the uniqueness of human resources should not be overstated:
other resources can also be withdrawn at the behest of the resource provider. This points to the importance of the structure of relationships that firms have with resource providers (Burt 1992) and how changes in these relationships drive the structure and dynamics of competition.
An organization's managerial capabilities reflect its interactions with the environment.
How an organization relates to this part of the environment plays a crucial role in shaping organizational outcomes and behavior. In most open systems theories of organizations, managers play a peripheral role; organizational decision makers are largely seen simply as an extension of the organization, and little attention has been paid to the role that variations in managerial capabilities play in determining organizational outcomes. For this reason, open systems theories have been faulted for an anti-managerial bias, or for having "beheaded" organizations (Finkelstein and Hambrick 1996) . However, this should not lead us back to a closed-system view in which managerial effects are conceptualized exclusively in terms of internal firm processes. The arguments in this paper demonstrate that taking managerial discretion and strategic choice seriously does not require a return to closed-system theories. Rather, open-systems theories must see the characteristics of a firm's management team as a product of its interaction with its environment and see managerial capabilities as in part a reflection of a firm's history of turnover among top managers. The issues involved are complex; addressing them carefully should lead to a substantial enrichment of organizational theory. 
